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Civil Orders for Protection: Freedom or Entrapment? 
Nina W. Tarr* 
INTRODUCTION 
Everyone knows what is best. Everyone knows how to fix her. 
Everyone has advice. Everyone knows how to punish her. We call 
her “a battered woman” as if this says it all, although she dislikes the 
tag. We treat her like a “bad girl” who will not do what any of us 
says.  
Women who are hurt by loved ones, family members, intimate 
acquaintances, and household members are multidimensional and 
their experiences are all over the map. Civil Orders for Protection 
(Orders for Protection)1 are the most readily available legal means of 
accessing the protection of the state to separate the woman from her 
batterer. Once labeled a “battered woman,” however, society assumes 
that a woman automatically fits into the helpless construct that is 
associated with the “battered woman syndrome.” If she is not 
seriously hurt or not helpless enough, then society finds that she is 
not a battered woman and should not be allowed to take advantage of 
the beneficence to which “deserving” helpless women are entitled; 
that is, she does not adequately portray society’s idea of the damsel in 
distress. Yet, if she is a helpless creature who is worthy of special 
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 1. This Article exclusively addresses the issues associated with Civil Orders for 
Protection, as opposed to Criminal Orders for Protection which prosecutors may seek as part of 
a criminal case. In most states, a violation of a Civil Order for Protection will result in criminal 
charges, but the Petitioner in the civil case is considered the victim and not the state. 
157 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p157 Tarr book pages.doc  1/14/2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
158 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 11:157 
 
treatment, then she forfeits the respect afforded to other adults who 
are allowed by our legal system to make autonomous choices. 
Who is she? She is an adult woman who is trying to survive, and 
she often does quite a good job of it. However, we, as lawyers and 
advocates who encounter her at the one moment she comes to our 
office to obtain an Order for Protection can lose sight of the whole 
picture as we try to get that piece of paper in her hand. Orders for 
Protection play a critical role in protecting individual women, 
stimulating the cross-disciplinary study of domestic abuse, and 
alerting the civil and criminal justice systems, as well as the public, 
as to the pervasiveness of domestic violence. Research has shown 
that the main dynamic in a battering relationship is “social 
entrapment,” described as the social extension of “entrapment.” 
“Entrapment” is characterized by “(1) a focus on social isolation, 
fear, and coercion that men’s violence creates in women’s lives; (2) 
attention to the indifference of powerful institutions to women’s 
suffering; and (3) identification of ways that men’s coercive control 
can be aggravated by structural inequalities of gender, class and 
racism.”2 The original concept of an Order for Protection as a means 
of helping women escape social entrapment has been undermined 
because many state agents now use the existence of one as a means to 
coerce and control women. Consequently, rather than allowing a 
woman to escape social entrapment, an Order for Protection can 
further entrap the woman. By obtaining an Order of Protection, a 
woman may be substituting an intimate batterer with the all-powerful 
state machine. What becomes apparent is that state social systems are 
a quagmire, and a decision that may be strategically sound for one 
goal may significantly undermine other legal, social, and 
psychological objectives. 
Most importantly, as laws and state actors have begun to approach 
intervention in domestic abuse cases more aggressively, women are 
consequentially forced to seek Orders for Protection. Psychological 
research indicates that one of the most significant benefits of seeking 
and obtaining an Order for Protection is that the woman feels 
 
 2. JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM; THE POWER OF JUDICIAL 
RESPONSES 10 (1999). 
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empowered because she has successfully initiated the action.3 The 
legal systems and policies that impose the “one size fits all” approach 
do women a psychological disservice by either forcing them to get an 
Order for Protection, punishing them for failing to do so, or denying 
them a voice and recognition if they fail to comport with the current 
agenda.  
Twenty years ago, we, as advocates, hoped that Orders for 
Protection would invoke the criminal justice system to protect 
victims of abuse, but now we see that relying on the legal system can 
make the life of abuse victims even more unmanageable. A woman 
who seeks an Order for Protection because she is being abused in 
either her home or partnership risks finding herself the “victim” of a 
host of Alice in Wonderland experiences that may result from the 
policies of mandatory arrests, “hard” no-drop policies,4 state child 
protective services, overcrowded courts, insurance discrimination, 
welfare benefit loss, employment discrimination, immigration 
policies, and “equality theory” child custody laws.  
This Article describes some of the ways that the state now entraps 
battered women by the Order for Protection system so that lawyers 
and advocates will fully advise their clients of the consequence of 
their choices.  
Part I provides a brief synopsis of the legal resources available to 
women before the availability of Orders for Protection, briefly 
describes how the situation has changed in most jurisdictions, and 
highlights the legal benefits of Orders for Protection. Part II discusses 
the psychological benefits of an Order for Protection and then 
provides some data to illustrate what might happen when cases 
proceed. Part III, the major part of the Article, examines the 
unforeseen consequences of obtaining an Order for Protection that 
we, as advocates, often ignore when counseling clients, including: the 
psychological costs; the risks of losing children in custody battles 
with family members or the State; the loss of autonomy and free 
agency for the victim in the criminal justice system; the impact on her 
employment and the possibility of employment discrimination; the 
 
 3. Karla Fischer & Mary Rose, When “Enough is Enough”: Battered Women’s Decision 
Making Around Orders of Protection, 41 CRIME AND DELINQ. 414, 423-25 (1995). 
 4. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
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likelihood of changes in both life and health insurance eligibility or 
liability; the chance of a change in immigration status; and the 
potential loss of government benefits. 
The literature written on domestic abuse contains many references 
to the theory that domestic or partner violence is partially the result of 
the perpetrator’s frustration at being unable to “control” either his life 
or that of his victim. Control is a core concept in understanding the 
dynamics of intimate violence.5 Additionally, control is a core 
concept in understanding the frustration of individuals who have 
attempted to use the legal system to ameliorate or eliminate the 
problem of intimate violence. 
Frequently, when the legal system attempts to control violence, it 
fails, and the situation explodes with new forms of chaos. For 
example, prosecutors may attempt to gain control by adopting “no-
drop” policies which force an abused woman to testify regardless of 
the likely impact of her testimony.6 The prosecutors may or may not 
get a conviction, but even if they do, the conviction will rarely result 
in incarceration. Regardless, by forcing her to testify, the prosecutor 
has created more chaos for the woman who has already suffered from 
her lack of meaningful control over her abuser’s violent behavior. 
The child welfare agency may try to control the violence in the home 
by accusing the woman of failing to protect her children. Thereafter, 
the welfare agency may remove the children, who end up in the 
nightmare of the legal systems that are designed to protect the 
welfare of both abused and neglected children. Each component of 
the legal system blames another. Meanwhile, the woman who is 
trying to exercise control over her own life becomes further 
entrapped. 
I. LEGAL REMEDIES BEFORE ORDERS FOR PROTECTION 
In the 1970s, in most jurisdictions of the United States, a woman 
who was hurt by her husband, partner, lover or household member 
would have had to overcome huge hurdles to compel the state to 
 
 5. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
 6. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text. 
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intervene in her home to protect her. Now, some argue, the pendulum 
has swung to the other extreme so that a battered woman cannot get 
the state out of her home. A historical perspective on the cumbersome 
nature of a battered woman’s legal alternatives assists in 
understanding the costs and benefits of today’s Orders for Protection.  
A. Civil Remedies  
The only civil remedy available to most women before the 
movement to make Orders for Protection available was an injunction 
in one of three varieties: temporary (emergency), preliminary, or a 
permanent restraining order. In order to get an injunction, the woman 
had to bring a lawsuit, which, in most cases, meant a divorce 
proceeding. Thus, only a married woman had standing to bring the 
requisite civil action to receive the injunction. The battered woman 
had to be prepared to file for divorce or legal separation, and a hurdle 
for many women was accepting that their marriages had to end before 
the legal system could intervene to stop the violence. Furthermore, 
the “no-fault” divorce movement had not yet taken hold, so the 
woman had to allege sufficient grounds to warrant the divorce.  
Most courts were not receptive to pro se divorces, and neither pro 
bono lawyers nor free legal aid were readily available. Consequently, 
a woman had to have sufficient funds to hire a lawyer and pay the 
filing, court, and service fees. Given the extra motions for temporary 
relief and additional courtroom appearances by the lawyer, which 
were necessary to procure an injunction, the divorce would not be 
“simple.” Thus, lawyers would charge higher retaining fees and 
predict larger litigation costs. Moreover, many jurisdictions required 
a bond for the issuance of a civil injunction, which also required 
additional cash or property.7  
The time delays at each stage of a divorce were staggering. To get 
the case started, the 1970’s battered woman would be interviewed by 
the lawyer who would produce the paperwork. The paperwork 
included the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, a Summons, a 
Motion for a Temporary (or Emergency) Injunction, and supporting 
Affidavits. The lawyer filed the papers at the courthouse and then had 
 
 
 7. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-103 (1993). 
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to find a judge who would put the case on his or her calendar. Only 
rarely would a judge hear a case on the day that it was filed because 
of the calendar backlog. Courts frowned on ex parte proceedings, so 
only in the most egregious situations, or in cases heard by 
sympathetic judges, could a woman obtain a hearing on an 
emergency injunction, the only type of injunction that did not require 
notice to the other party. More often, the papers had to be served on 
the batterer before the judge would even see the lawyer and the 
battered woman. Further delays would occur as either the sheriff or 
other process servers tracked down the batterer to serve him with all 
of the documents, and thus give notice of the hearing on the 
injunction. In some jurisdictions, even if the case were heard as an 
emergency injunction, the judge would ask for live testimony of the 
battered woman. The judge may have also required corroborating 
witnesses, so the lawyer would have to put off the hearing until 
testimony could be prepared. Even if the court accepted affidavits, 
the lawyer still needed time to prepare the witnesses. 
If the woman wanted to have a judge hear her Motion for a 
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on an ex parte basis, in most 
jurisdictions, she would have to prove that “immediate and 
irreparable injury, loss or damage” would result before notice could 
be served.8 The court arranged a priority setting for the hearing on the 
preliminary injunction, because the TRO automatically expired in ten 
days. If she convinced the court to hear the case as an emergency, the 
woman had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was likely to 
prevail in the case, and further, that she had no other remedies at law 
available.9 
The available remedy was usually limited to ordering the batterer 
to stay away from the woman because the courts preferred to follow 
standard procedures on the issues of custody, child support, 
possession of real and personal property, alimony, and division of 
debts. Regardless of whether it was a temporary, preliminary, or 
permanent injunction, a violation was at worst considered civil 
contempt, requiring a tremendously cumbersome proceeding to alert 
 
 8. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-101 (1993). 
 9. Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered 
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993). 
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the court to the violation. Again, the lawyer had to draft documents 
such as an Order to Show Cause, including supporting Affidavits, and 
a Notice of Hearing, and then serve them on the batterer. If the 
batterer appeared and the court found a violation, the court usually 
issued a ruling to find the batterer in contempt. Such a ruling had no 
actual consequence; instead, it usually amounted to a verbal “slap on 
the hand.” Sometimes, the batterer might be fined, but only in 
extreme cases might he be jailed for civil contempt. 
II. CIVIL ORDER OF PROTECTION SYSTEMS 
A. Legal Benefits of the Civil Order for Protection System 
Most U.S. jurisdictions have created systems allowing battered 
women to obtain an emergency Order for Protection using forms, in 
an expedited proceeding, and without paying a filing fee. The details 
of both the laws and procedures vary from one jurisdiction to 
another.10 The law in Illinois11 is fairly typical, however, so this 
Article uses it as a prototype to discuss covered persons, definitions 
of abuse, timing issues, expenses, and available remedies. 
In most jurisdictions, Orders for Protection are available to a wide 
class of abused persons. As a result, a woman no longer must be 
married to her batterer and file for divorce before she can seek the 
protection of the law without the help of the police or a prosecutor. 
For example, the Illinois Domestic Violence Act protects “any person 
abused by a family or household member.”12  
 
 10. Battered women often see an advocate or lawyer at some stage in the process of 
obtaining a permanent Order for Protection, often for a related matter, so opportunities exist to 
counsel them on the topics raised in this Article. For example, a lawyer representing a woman 
in a divorce may learn that the woman is abused and will blithely advise her to get an Order for 
Protection on her own rather than to pay her attorney’s fees. It is an error for that lawyer to fail 
to consider all of the consequences of that advice. 
 11. The Illinois Domestic Violence Act was first passed in 1986. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
60/101-401 (1993). 
 12. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/201(a)(i) (1993). This section further includes: (ii) any high 
risk adult with disabilities who is abused, neglected or exploited by a family or household 
member; (iii) any minor child or dependent adult in the care of such a person; and (iv) any 
person residing or employed at a private home or public shelter which is housing an abused 
family or household member. “Family or household members” are defined in the statute as 
including: 
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Prior to the enactment of Order for Protection statutes, most 
judges, police, and prosecutors did not think that the justice system 
should intervene in domestic matters, so a battered woman received 
protection only if she had severe injuries. Under most modern 
statutes, an abused woman may obtain an Order for Protection to stop 
physical abuse before it escalates.13 In addition, a woman can get an 
Order for Protection against harassment, which is defined in Illinois 
as “knowing conduct which is not necessary to accomplish a purpose 
that is reasonable under the circumstances; would cause a reasonable 
person emotional distress; and does cause emotional distress to the 
petitioner.”14 
The filing process has been simplified so that a battered woman 
can apply for an Emergency Civil Order for Protection without the 
assistance of a lawyer by using forms obtained from a clerk at the 
courthouse, an advocate, or a Prosecutor’s office, depending on the 
jurisdiction. Women may thereby take advantage of these forms 
without the expense and access problems of hiring an attorney. But 
the placement of the forms in prosecutors’ offices, so that battered 
women must talk to either an assistant prosecutor or a victim’s 
advocate, creates potential conflicts which will be later discussed in 
this Article. The priorities of the prosecutor may not completely 
coincide with those of the battered woman. Eventually, they may 
even have a direct conflict if the prosecutor decides to intervene on 
behalf of the children, prosecute the batterer against the woman’s 
wishes, or prosecute the woman for either a failure to protect her 
children or contempt. In some counties, battered woman find that 
“advocates” can create a barrier to the courts because they screen the 
 
[S]pouses, former spouses, parents, children, stepchildren and other persons related by 
blood or by present or prior marriage, persons who share or formerly shared a common 
dwelling, persons who have or allegedly have a child in common, persons who share 
or allegedly share a blood relationship through a child, persons who have or have had a 
dating or engagement relationship, [and] persons with disabilities and their personal 
assistants . . . . 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(6) (1993). 
 13. Under 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(1) (1993), abuse includes “physical abuse, 
harassment, intimidation of a dependent, interference with personal liberty or willful 
deprivation.” 
 14. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103(7) (1993). 
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applicants and exercise some judgment as to whether the woman 
should even apply for an Emergency Order. The advocates of most 
battered women deserve praise and admiration for their commitment 
and efforts, but there are still counties and poorly trained individual 
advocates whose services are more of a hindrance than a help. For 
example, some advocates may be serving their own interests, if their 
funding is conditioned on successful representation, or if they 
perceive a personal ego threat. They may be intimidated by a judge 
who is impatient with “frivolous applications,” feel pressure from the 
local defense bar, or may simply feel overwhelmed.  
In theory, the forms provided for battered women who seek 
protection are simplified, but as the law in this area becomes more 
complex, the “simple” forms have followed suit. Thus, most are now 
impossible for a lay-person to comprehend. Specifically, a single 
form includes allegations that the woman has a relationship with the 
batterer that puts her in the protected group of people, factual 
allegations regarding the abuse, questions regarding her children, 
finances, personal and real property, as well as questions regarding 
the court’s jurisdiction over the case, and a section on remedies. In 
some courtrooms, the judge expects the applicant to have completed 
a proposed form order before going to the courtroom, but in others 
the judge completes the order. Most jurisdictions have eliminated or 
reduced the filing fees. 
In the busier courtrooms around the country, judges have a special 
docket each day to hear Petitions for Emergency Orders for 
Protection, thus eliminating the scheduling delays of the Motions for 
Temporary Injunctions. The judge reviews the paperwork and takes 
either sworn or unsworn statements from the battered woman. If the 
Emergency Order is granted, the woman will immediately receive the 
paper Order. The court will provide the sheriff with a copy to serve, 
and will notify the police department of the Emergency Order in case 
they receive a call regarding a violation. One issue that remains a 
problem in some jurisdictions is the sheriffs’ lack of diligence in 
serving Emergency Orders on respondents. 
Because Emergency Orders for Protection are ex parte orders, the 
petitioner must generally return to court within ten days. At a 
subsequent hearing, the petitioner has an opportunity to argue before 
the judge as to why the Emergency Order should be continued for 
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some fixed amount of time, and the respondent has a chance argue 
why the Order should not be entered. These proceedings may turn 
into fairly complex evidentiary hearings in which witnesses are 
sworn in, the rules of evidence are applied to the admission of 
information, and both parties present and cross-examine witnesses. 
The questions of negotiations, mediations, settlement conferences, 
and reciprocal orders for protection arise in the context of these 
contested hearings. If the woman prevails, the judge issues a 
Restraining Order and sends the parties on their way. If not, the 
woman can reapply for a new Emergency Order when another 
incident occurs. 
Aside from holding a batterer in contempt, courts around the 
country now provide battered women with a wide variety of 
injunctions, including orders prohibiting abuse, neglect, exploitation, 
stalking, harassment, etc. Additionally, other options include: orders 
for the grant of the exclusive possession of a shared residence; “stay 
away” orders; orders for mandatory counseling of a variety of types; 
awards of the physical care and possession of minor children; 
temporary legal custody; visitation; prohibitions from removing or 
concealing minor children; possession of personal property 
(including vehicles); protection of personal property; payment of 
child support or spousal maintenance; reimbursement for financial 
losses caused by the abuse; prohibition of entry; prohibitions of 
firearms possession; prohibition of access to records; orders of 
payment for shelter services; and orders for other injunctive relief.15 
This array of remedies is much broader than what was available 
historically.  
In a 1993 article, Professor Joan S. Meier synthesized several of 
the theories which integrated law and psychology in an attempt to 
understand domestic violence.16 The early part of the twentieth 
century saw a shift away from the view that wife battering was as 
acceptable a form of punishment as punishing children and animals, 
and was therefore “normal.” Perception shifted to the assumption 
that, in the pathological families where battering occurred, it was as a 
 
 15. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 (1993). 
 16. Joan Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological & Legal 
Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295 (1993). 
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result of the woman’s masochism. When Lenore Walker first 
articulated the concept of the “battered woman’s syndrome” and 
explained the “cycle of violence,” the perspective shifted to seeing 
battered women as victims who had “learned helplessness.”17 In the 
few cases where a woman met all of the requirements of the 
“syndrome,” she could invoke the defense to her benefit in a criminal 
case, but the syndrome worked to her disadvantage in any civil case. 
The consequence of the battered woman’s syndrome analysis is that 
judges and juries saw battered women as abnormal and responsible 
for their own abuse.18 Another analysis suggested that battered 
women exhibited the symptoms of post-traumatic stress syndrome 
because of their state of being constantly alert (hyperarousal), the 
constant reliving of the original abuse (intrusion), and their frequent 
numb or detached state (constriction).19 As Meier points out, this 
explanation moved the analysis away from the woman’s character to 
an examination of her behavior. The theory suffered the same 
limitations as the battered women’s syndrome because it required the 
evidence of many behavioral characteristics in order to be useful. 
Mary Ann Dutton, a clinical psychologist and Meier’s collaborator, 
suggested that an alternative approach would be to examine the 
context of both the pattern of violence and the woman’s strategy for 
response.20 The four key components of Dutton’s analysis include the 
history of abuse (including the scope and severity), the woman’s 
psychological response, her strategic responses, and other intervening 
factors.21 Meier agrees that this approach is useful for understanding 
battered women. She points out, however, that the approach is 
problematic from a legal perspective because it is too vague to be 
used in court, relies on the woman’s psychological make-up 
rendering her vulnerable, and focuses on the woman’s behavior 
instead of the batterer’s conduct.22 
 
 17. Id. at 1310. 
 18. Id. at 1306. 
 19. Id. at 1312-13. 
 20. Id. at 1315. See generally Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Response to 
Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Women’s Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191 
(1993). 
 21. Meier, supra note 16, at 1315. 
 22. Id. at 1316-17. 
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More recently, researchers have come to understand that the 
central issues in domestic and intimate violence are power, 
dominance, and control.23 Meier summarizes some of this analysis as 
follows: 
As Martha Mahoney points out, portrayal of the abuser’s 
exercise of power and control over the woman implicitly shifts 
the attention away from her psychology to his motivations for 
his violence. When it is clear that his violence, and everything 
else he does to her, is directed at controlling and possessing 
her, it is harder to blame her for what she did or didn’t do. 
Moreover, understanding the pattern of control makes it easier 
to understand how she “didn’t leave” during the time when he 
“wasn’t violent.” Second, as Evan Stark points out, focusing 
on power and control can counter the tendency of the courts to 
focus on specifiable incidents of physical violence (usually 
meaning injury), which often trivializes the severity of abuse 
relationships in which little or no physical injury occurs, yet 
the abuse is profound, severe, and extensive. Finally, the 
abuser’s need for power and control may bring to the surface a 
dynamic which is common in these cases in court, but rarely 
identified: the courts’ intimidation by batterers and the framing 
of compliant responses so as to avoid provoking his rage and 
possible violence.24 
Evan Stark, a social worker and psychologist, theorizes that the 
concept of “entrapment” best summarizes the experience of battered 
women because “what creates a battered woman is neither violence 
per se nor the psychological status of either party, but the mix of 
social and psychological factors that make it seemingly impossible 
for the victim to escape or to effectively protect herself from 
abuse.”25 The batterer uses his control to permeate all aspects of the 
 
 23. Id. at 1317. 
 24. Id. at 1318 (footnotes omitted) (citing Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered 
Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 57 (1991); Evan Stark, 
Framing and Reframing Battered Women, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RESPONSE 287, 279-82 (Eva Buzawa ed. 1993)). 
 25. Id. at 1319 (quoting Stark, supra note 24, at 290). 
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woman’s life, including all of her basic needs and relationships.26  
When a woman applies for an Order for Protection, she shifts the 
dynamics of power, dominance, and control which provides her with 
psychological benefits.27 James Ptacek theorizes that the main benefit 
a woman receives may arise from the knowledge that she may invoke 
the criminal justice system.28 According to research by Karla Fischer 
and Mary Rose, a woman may find that applying for an Order for 
Protection provides an opportunity to reclaim what she has lost.29 
Most significantly, the Order for Protection alters the pattern of 
power, dominance and control.30 According to Fischer, Vidmar and 
Ellis, another psychological benefit of applying for an Order of 
Protection is moving the woman beyond her state of denial because 
the application process requires her to articulate the specifics of the 
abuse, and to name it as such.31 
Thus, Orders for Protection best serve to end domestic abuse if 
they give the woman a new sense of control over her own life. As the 
rest of this Article makes clear, however, both the legal system and 
the state have undermined this powerful benefit by entrapping the 
woman in a new quagmire. Rather than being controlled by an 
abuser, once a woman has applied for an Order for Protection, she is 
incapable of either escaping her status as an “abused woman” or 
protecting herself from the state.  
III. PRESSURES ON WOMEN WHO ARE MOTHERS  
A. Custody Cases 
Battered women with children may find that facts are treated 
differently in various courtrooms within the same jurisdiction. The 
judge who is hearing a woman’s custody case against the father of 
her children may discount her allegations of domestic abuse as 
 
 26. Id. at 1319; See also Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of 
Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117 (1993). 
 27. Fischer & Rose, supra note 3, at 422. 
 28. PTACEK, supra note 2, at 167. 
 29. Fischer & Rose, supra note 3, at 423. 
 30. Id. at 425. 
 31. Id. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p157 Tarr book pages.doc  1/14/2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
170 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 11:157 
 
irrelevant to the best interest of the children. The woman must 
consider the costs of accusing her children’s father of domestic 
violence and removing him from the home. She may fear that he will 
offer accusations of abuse against her so that she will lose custody. In 
many states, “friendly parent” provisions raise the stakes on filing an 
Order for Protection, and yet if a woman does not get an Order for 
Protection, she risks being accused of a failure to protect her children. 
The various theories proposed by scholars attempting to explain 
battered women’s circumstances consistently seem to backfire on 
women when the theories are applied by the courts in custody cases.32 
Mothers who are victims of domestic violence are vulnerable at 
every turn. At the outset, a mother may stay in an abusive 
relationship because she does not see alternatives which provide for a 
“family.” Her constructed image of what a life is “supposed to be” 
may include a male in the home, regardless of his behavior. 
Accordingly, she may tolerate the intolerable to perpetuate the 
illusion for herself, her children, and for the outside world that 
everything is “okay.” In the same way that cycles of violence have 
“honeymoon” or positive periods for the mother, the batterer will 
have positive periods with the children. Accordingly, the mother may 
cling to those images to rationalize her decision to continue to live 
with a dangerous man. Consciously or unconsciously, a batterer can 
use these desires to manipulate a mother. 
A mother may also fear the practical problems associated with 
being a single mom. For instance, she knows that without a partner, 
she is likely to lose income, financial security, child care, a co-parent 
to nurture or discipline the children, companionship, another person 
to provide transportation, and a general helpmate. The world tends to 
see only one aspect of a battered woman’s life and forgets that the 
batterer is likely to interact with her and her children in a multi-
faceted manner so that there are both costs and benefits to separating 
from him. On Friday night, he may burn her with a cigarette, but on 
Saturday morning he will coach his child’s Little League team. They 
both know that at any moment he can hurt her, and that dynamic is 
ever-present, even in the moments of apparent calm. Nevertheless, 
 
 32. Meier, supra note 16, at 1309 nn.44-47 and accompanying text. 
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she may convince herself that his contributions are worth the risks. 
Many batterers recognize that an easy way to maintain control of a 
woman is to frighten her with the threat of losing her children. If the 
batterer has isolated and/or sufficiently demeaned a woman so that 
she has no self-confidence in her ability to judge reality, he can 
convince her that she is a bad mother who is undeserving of her 
children.33 She may believe she is a bad person who deserves to be 
punished, that she neglects to care for her children properly, and that 
her life is so unmanageable that she cannot adequately care for her 
children on her own. Many battered women are convinced that the 
batterer in their lives is much more effective at manipulating systems, 
including systems of justice, and that if he tries, he can successfully 
convince a court or investigator that the woman is undeserving of 
custody. 
The mother may find herself up against a court’s preference to 
award custody of the children to the “friendly parent.”34 The “friendly 
parent” is the one who does not make allegations about the other 
parent, who does not withhold access to the child, and who is 
cooperative. Conversely, “unfriendly parents” are those who make 
allegations and who are “alienating.” As such, the friendly parent gets 
the child, or at least more time with the child. The flaw with this 
analysis is that “custody becomes a regard for behavior which is not 
necessarily correlated to the child’s interest.”35 The difficulty for a 
battered woman is that if she tries to protect her children from an 
abusive relationship without the benefit of a court order, courts will 
see her as “unfriendly” and award custody to the abuser.36 If she 
applies for an Order for Protection and it is denied, then the abuser 
has further evidence that she is unfriendly and once more he gets the 
upper-hand. If, on the other hand, she chooses not to report the 
violence or abuse to anyone, then she can later be accused of failing 
to protect her children. Moreover, as we have seen, her credibility is 
 
 33. See, e.g., JODY RAPHAEL, SAVING BERNICE: BATTERED WOMEN, WELFARE, AND 
POVERTY 40 (2000). 
 34. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Lawrence, 20 P.3d 972 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); Custody of 
Nunn, 14 P.3d 175 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). 
 35. Margaret K. Dore & J. Mark Weiss, Lawrence and Nunn Reject the “Friendly 
Parent” Concept, 6 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 81 (2001). 
 36. Id. at 82. 
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diminished if she subsequently tries to raise the previous abuse in a 
custody trial. The judge will be skeptical of her claims, and will 
wonder why she did not apply for an Order for Protection. 
Jurisdictions vary in their treatment of domestic abuse in custody 
cases.37 Some courts have a presumption that custody cannot be 
awarded to a parent who has committed domestic abuse. In other 
jurisdictions, domestic abuse is simply a factor to be considered when 
determining the best interests of the children. These jurisdictions may 
force a woman to prove that the domestic abuse has had a direct 
impact on her children.38 If she proves that the abuse has had an 
impact on her children, the court may find that the mother is a 
“battered woman” who is not strong or assertive enough to parent or 
protect her children. If the abuse was bad enough, then the court 
reasons that the woman should have obtained an Order for Protection. 
If she applied for an Order for Protection and did not receive one, she 
is an unfriendly parent. If the abuse was not sufficient to merit an 
Order for Protection, the court may question why the mother is 
raising it as an issue in the custody case. Thus, around and around the 
mother must go in deciding how to proceed. 
If a woman receives an Order for Protection and does not call the 
police after each violation, subsequent agencies and courts may view 
her with skepticism. Did the violation really occur? Was she lying 
then or is she lying now? This questioning of her veracity may 
discredit her testimony on other fronts. If she is involved in a custody 
case, should the court believe her? If she is testifying in the state’s 
prosecution of the batterer, and she testifies about incidents when she 
did not call the police, is her credibility destroyed before the jury? 
Does she do better to get the Order for Protection or not? 
One of the most unfortunate developments in the past few years is 
a battering man’s use of pro se Orders for Protection to get 
emergency custody of his children. When battered women begin to 
articulate that they are considering leaving, men have discovered that 
they can reassert their control by misusing the legal system. The men 
win the race to the courthouse and present the judge with a story 
 
 37. Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence 
on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1044 (1991). 
 38. Id. 
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about the mother’s erratic behavior toward her children, or tell the 
judge that she is the first aggressor in their disputes. Judges often feel 
compelled to apply an “equality theory” approach to these allegations 
which means that they take the allegations at face value and issue 
emergency orders to grant batterers with temporary “possession” of 
the children. Even though this type of Order does not result in formal 
custody in most jurisdictions, and a subsequent evidentiary hearing 
on the question of temporary or permanent custody will always 
follow, the initial strike still has the effect of terrifying the woman 
that she will lose her children. This manipulation of the legal system 
re-enforces the woman’s fears that the system will work against her, 
thus bolstering the man’s perception of power, and further confusing 
their children. Despite the language in both statutes and cases on the 
“best interest of the children,” many judges show a strong preference 
in favor of maintaining continuity in a child’s custody arrangement. 
As a result, once a father wins the first round in court, he has put the 
woman in a defensive posture that can often be difficult to overcome. 
B. Battered Women Caught up in Accusations of Child Abuse 
 and Neglect 
Mothers who are battered by their household partners, lovers, or 
husbands risk losing their children in child neglect proceedings 
unless they attempt to obtain an Order for Protection. In particular, an 
Order must be sought if a mother has been involved with someone 
who has hurt her, regardless of whether she continues to live with 
him or faces his harassment after separation. States often use 
evidence of a mother’s failure to do so as evidence of a “failure to 
protect” in a child abuse and neglect proceeding. Failure to protect is 
considered “passive child abuse,”39 and its liability usually requires 
that “(1) the defendant had a legal duty to protect the child, (2) the 
defendant had actual or constructive notice of the foreseeability of 
abuse, (3) the child was exposed to such abuse, and (4) the defendant 
failed to prevent such abuse.”40 Put somewhat differently, parents 
 
 39. Jeanne A. Fugate, Note, Who’s Failing Whom? A Critical Look at Failure to Protect 
Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 279 (2001). 
 40. Id.  
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may be penalized under “commission statutes,” if they are the actual 
abuser, or under “omission statutes,” if they passively expose 
children to the risk of harm or fail to protect them.41 Parents may be 
found for a failure to protect if they “fail to prevent actual abuse by 
an identifiable offender.”42 More recently, liability has ensued if they 
“‘permit’ children to remain in an environment where abuse could 
occur or the risk of harm is evident.”43 
As Jeanne Fugate has explained, in the typical case, “a woman 
[does] not perform her ‘maternal role’ adequately to convince a court 
that she shielded a child from the abuse of a boyfriend, live-in lover, 
or spouse, or even someone not in an intimate relationship with 
[her].”44 Very few reported cases which report a failure to protect 
have been brought against men.45 Fugate theorizes that the gender 
disparity is caused by the greater number of women who have 
custody of their children. She also argues, though, that the gender 
disparity is a result of courts applying an elevated scrutiny to women 
as well as gender stereotypes including the “All-Sacrificing Mother, 
the All-Knowing (and thus All-Blamed) Mother and the Nurturing 
Mother/Breadwinning Father.”46 Of these, the stereotype of the “All-
 
 41. Melissa A. Trepiccione, At the Crossroads of Law and Social Science: Is Charging a 
Battered Mother with Failure to Protect her Child an Acceptable Solution When her Child 
Witnesses Domestic Violence? 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1487, 1490 (2001). 
 42. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 43. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 44. Fugate, supra note 39, at 279-80. 
 45. Id. at 281. 
 46. Id. at 289. According to Fugate:  
[The “All-Sacrificing Mother” is] the most revered form of love, a mother’s love for 
her child, is expected to overcome “all physical, financial, emotional and moral 
obstacles,” including, in the realm of failure-to-protect laws, any victimization at the 
hands of another. The Courts wrongly assume first that a mother can leave the abuser 
and, second, that a threat of imprisonment [or separation] will encourage her to act to 
protect her children when she otherwise would not. Courts demand that women, in 
contrast to men, must sacrifice their safety, including standing up to the men who beat 
them, in order to save their children and fulfill their “maternal instinct.”  
Id. at 290-91.  
 Courts disregard arguments that the mother may have tried to leave or that her attempts 
were ineffective. The courts assume that an Order for Protection is an effective means of 
protection against any form of violence, that shelters are available to anyone, and financial 
safety nets will always be there. Id. at 290-94. 
 The “all-knowing” stereotype assumes that a woman knows everything that is going on 
with her children and therefore is to blame if anything has a negative impact on her children. 
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Sacrificing Mother” who will protect her young at all costs, and 
against all odds, is the one that has most worked against battered 
women who are unable to extricate themselves from their batterers.47 
The jurisprudence has shifted away from its earlier presumption 
that children should not be removed from their abused mothers unless 
the state can prove that the children have been harmed. The 
jurisprudence then shifted to the presumption that if children 
observed abuse, then they had been harmed and, therefore, should be 
removed from the abused mother’s care. Therefore, the state no 
longer had a burden to prove harm, and need only show that the child 
had observed abuse.48 Thus, the pendulum has now swung even 
further in favor of removal, and the latest presumption is that children 
are harmed when they live in a home where the mother is being 
abused, regardless of whether they observe the abuse or not.49 
Battered mothers are strictly liable for any harm to their 
children.50 It does not matter whether a mother hurt her child or if she 
intended to hurt her child, or whether she tried to leave but was 
prevented by the batterer. Courts are disinterested in hearing a 
mother’s opinion that leaving was more dangerous than staying.51 If 
the mother stays in a situation where she herself is being hurt, then 
she is responsible.52 Some courts apply an “objective” or “reasonably 
prudent parent” standard which assumes that any abuse in the home 
is unacceptable and a reasonable person would get an Order for 
Protection.53 Some courts modify this standard by considering the 
reasonably prudent parent “under like circumstances,” and thereby 
take into account some characteristics of either the person or her 
 
Men do not have the same level of responsibility. Id. at 294-97. 
 Courts often assume that mothers raise their children while the men earn the family’s 
money. If a woman goes to work, she is seen as abandoning her children to a male caregiver 
and, therefore, has no excuse if something happens to the child while in the caretaker’s care. Id. 
at 297-98. 
 47. Id. at 290-94. 
 48. Trepiccione, supra note 41, at 1491. 
 49. See G. Kristian Miccio, A Reasonable Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing, 
and Recreating the Battered Mother in Child Protective Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 
89, 111-13 (1999) (citing In re Katherine C., 122 Misc. 2d 276, 278-79 (1984)).  
 50. Trepiccione, supra note 41, at 1494; see also Miccio, supra note 49, at 107-10.  
 51. Miccio, supra note 49, at 109. 
 52. Id. at 117. 
 53. Id. at 110-12. 
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situation.54  
G. Kristian Miccio has suggested that courts should apply the 
“reasonable battered mother test” (RBMT).55 She argues that because 
the state contributes to trapping women in situations prone to 
battering, it should not accuse women of a failure to protect unless it 
takes into account the social context of the violence.56 Miccio 
believes that “neutrality obscures the gendered nature of domestic 
violence, the state’s failure to respond and the construct of mothering. 
The RBMT functions then as both a legal and social corrective.”57 
Miccio is correct that in dependency and neglect proceedings, the 
courts should use the RBMT rather than an objective standard, but 
not for the reasons that she articulates. In her Article, she relies on 
many cases from the 1980s that illustrate circumstances where 
hospitals did not intervene, police failed to arrest, prosecutors failed 
to prosecute, and the criminal justice system failed to convict, thus 
leaving mothers vulnerable to their batterers. Miccio fails to consider 
Iowa, Oklahoma and Minnesota, which recognize affirmative 
defenses that take into account duress or an inability to act because of 
a reasonable fear of the abuser.58 
As the rest of this Article illustrates, the state no longer neglects 
battered women. In fact, the state is ready to intervene in every aspect 
of their lives. Battered mothers are not allowed to exercise full 
autonomy or act as independent agents because so many competing 
forces compel them to behave in a particular manner. Consequently, 
in neglect and abuse proceedings, courts must either use the RBMT 
or unfairly hold the mother accountable for many dynamics outside 
of her control. Policies and procedures that are based on broad 
assumptions and essentialist stereotypes fail to take into account the 
individual nature of the lives of these women and their children. Not 
all battered women suffer the same type of abuse, and not all children 
experience the same situation. “One size fits all” reactive strategies 
that remove children from their mothers make no sense from social, 
 
 54. Id. at 112. 
 55. Id. at 94. 
 56. Id. at 119. 
 57. Id. at 115. 
 58. Trepiccione, supra note 41, at 1498. 
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psychological, legal, economic, or policy perspectives. In fact, one 
criticism of the social science studies that is often cited as the basis 
for removing children from home when they witness abuse is their 
diverging definitions of “abuse.” The studies do not distinguish who 
is being abused, and they do not distinguish between children who 
are observers as compared to children who are directly abused.59 
Furthermore, the studies are often based on information that is 
gathered at shelters from women and children who are in a state of 
turmoil. As such, causation is not always clear and the men’s 
perspective is invisible.60 Finally, other factors are unclear, such as 
the degree of violence, the history of violence, and the nature of the 
violence.61 Other flaws in the research include a failure to account for 
demographic variables, small sample sizes, lack of researchers’ 
training, and lack of longitudinal studies.62 
C. Insurance 
Women who are victims of domestic violence have been 
discriminated against by health insurance, life insurance, and home 
owners’ insurance companies.63 According to Ellen Morrison, both 
the American Council of Life Insurance and the Health Insurance 
Association of America advocate the practice of discriminating 
against battered women.64 Likewise, Prudential Insurance Company, 
First Colony Life Insurance, Nationwide, and State Farm Mutual 
Insurance Company, like many other insurance companies, have 
 
 59. Id. at 1503. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 1504. 
 63. Michelle J. Mandel, Ensuring that Victims of Domestic Abuse are Not Discriminated 
Against in the Insurance Industry, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 677 (1998); Ellen J. Morrison, 
Insurance Discrimination Against Battered Women: Proposed Legislative Protections, 72 IND. 
L.J. 259, 260 (1996). 
 64. Morrison, supra note 63, at 266 (citing Deborah L. Shelton, Adding Insult to Injury: 
Families Hurt by Domestic Violence Take a Second Hit When Insurers Deny them Coverage, 
AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 4, 1995, at 11-12; Fern Shen, For the Battered Spouse, Insurers’ Bias 
Worsens Pain, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1995, at A1; WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT & PENNSYLVANIA 
COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST VICTIMS OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (Sept. 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Women’s Law 
Project and the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence). 
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adopted underwriting procedures which discriminate against victims 
of domestic violence.65 When women apply for Orders for Protection, 
they create a public record which indicates that they have been 
abused. Insurers justify their discrimination by claiming that the 
status of being a battered woman is a pre-existing condition and that 
battered women choose to stay with their batterers.66 Insurance 
companies rely on their discretion to charge higher rates according to 
people’s proclivity toward dangerous activities or lifestyles.67 As 
such, they categorize battered women as a high risk group who will 
bankrupt the system, arguing that it is legitimate to charge these 
women additional costs for their insurance because it would be unfair 
to spread the cost of their injuries to others insured by the company.68 
In an attempt to legitimize the practice with regard to life insurance, 
the insurance industry claims that denial of life insurance protects 
battered women from being killed by their spouses for insurance 
money.69  
Although, the insurance industry has successfully thwarted any 
federal legislation prohibiting insurance discrimination against 
battered women,70 sixteen states have passed legislation attempting to 
 
 65. Morrison, supra note 64, at 275. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 272. 
 68. Id. at 273; see also Mandel, supra note 63, at 678. 
 69. Morrison, supra note 63, at 275. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss all of 
these arguments, but for a more lengthy discussion, see Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially 
Fair Insurance Pricing Actually Fair?: A Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 356 (1997). 
 70. Morrison, supra note 63, at 277-79, describes the 1995 bill as follows:  
The legislation, entitled the Victims of Abuse Insurance Protection Act, would prohibit 
insurers from denying abuse victims coverage in all forms of insurance. The proposed 
legislation reads:  
 (a) No insurer or health carrier may, directly or indirectly, engage in any of the 
following acts or practices on the basis that the applicant or insured, or any person 
employed by the applicant or insured or with whom the applicant or insured is known 
to have a relationship or association, is, has been, or may be the subject of abuse:  
 (1) Denying, refusing to issue, renew or reissue, or canceling or otherwise 
terminating an insurance policy or health benefit plan.  
 (2) Restricting, excluding, or limiting insurance or health benefit plan coverage for 
losses as a result of abuse or denying a claim incurred by an insured as a result of 
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limit this type of discrimination against battered women.71 Critics 
 
abuse, except as otherwise permitted or required by State laws relating to life 
insurance beneficiaries.  
 (3) Adding a premium differential to any insurance policy or health benefit plan.  
 (4) Terminating health coverage for a subject of abuse because coverage was 
originally issued in the name of the abuser and the abuser has divorced, separated 
from, or lost custody of the subject of abuse or the abuser’s coverage has terminated 
voluntarily or involuntarily . . . . Nothing in this paragraph prohibits the insurer from 
requiring the subject of abuse to pay full premium for the subject’s coverage under the 
health plan.  
 The language of this legislation constrains insurers from discriminating against 
domestic violence victims in several ways. First, insurance companies cannot refuse to 
issue or terminate an insurance policy on the basis of abuse. Second, insurers cannot 
limit coverage or deny claims which arise from domestic violence incidents. Third, the 
Bill prohibits companies from charging a higher premium based on a prior history of 
abuse. Finally, insurers cannot terminate health coverage for a domestic violence 
victim when the original coverage was issued in the abuser’s name and when the 
abuser’s acts would otherwise cause the victim to lose coverage.  
Id. (citing 145 H.R. 2654, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)). 
 According to Morrison, the legislation also provided for privacy and dual systems of 
remedies. Id. at 278. 
 71. Mandel, supra note 63, at 682 n.43 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-448 (West 
Supp. 1996) (prohibiting an insurance company from “denying, restricting, canceling, limiting 
or refusing to renew coverage based on the fact that the proposed insurer is or has been a victim 
of domestic violence”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304(24)(a) (Supp. 1996) (prohibiting the 
imposition of discriminating practices by life and health insurance companies against victims of 
domestic abuse); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541 (West 1995) (stating that an insurer may deny 
insurance based on an applicant’s medical condition, but shall not look at whether that 
condition was caused by an act of abuse); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-24.3-6 (Michie 1996) 
(restricting an insurer from “denying, refusing to contract with, or refusing to renew based on 
the fact that the individual has been or has the potential to be a victim of domestic violence”); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2404 (Supp. 1996) (prohibiting insurance discrimination on the sole 
basis of having been a domestic abuse victim, but permitting an insurance company to continue 
to underwrite on the basis of a preexisting physical or mental condition, even if that condition 
was caused by abuse); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2159-B (West 1996) (declaring that an 
insurer “who issues life, health or disability coverage may not deny, cancel, refuse to renew, or 
limit coverage based on the fact that the individual is a victim of abuse or has the potential to be 
a victim of abuse”); MD. ANN. CODE, Insurance § 234D (Supp. 1996) (declaring that if a person 
being considered for insurance is a victim of domestic abuse then the insurance company may 
not use information regarding the status of the person as a victim of domestic abuse to deny, 
cancel, or refuse to renew coverage; increase rates for life insurance, health insurance, or a 
health benefits plan; or apply a rating factor or underwriting practice that takes into account that 
information); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16B-4 (Michie 1997) (prohibiting an insurance company 
from unfairly discriminating against an individual based solely on their status as a victim of 
domestic abuse); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2612 (Consol. 1997) (prohibiting insurance discrimination 
against individuals solely because they have been a victim of domestic violence); TENN. CODE 
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have suggested that even these laws do not go far enough to protect 
battered women.72 
Ironically, The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
(NAIC), an association of state insurance regulators, has passed the 
“Unfair Discrimination Against Subjects of Abuse Model Act.”73 The 
Model Act focuses on battered women’s need for privacy and is 
based on the assumption that women may be hiding from their 
batterers.74 The Model Act attempts to prohibit the disclosure of 
information regarding abuse by insurers, and tries to establish 
protocols to protect victims of domestic abuse when they are working 
with insurance companies.75 Yet, the mere act of applying for an 
Order for Protection would obviate any protection that this meager 
Model Act might provide. 
Women who are denied insurance are not necessarily notified of 
the reason,76 and insurers are not required to report their criteria for 
underwriting.77 The existence of an Order for Protection, or even an 
application for an Emergency Order for Protection, may haunt a 
battered woman for years. 
D. Employment 
Because batterers seek women whom they can control, keeping 
their victims financially insecure can be a driving force for their 
abusive behavior.78 A batterer may attempt to sabotage a woman’s 
 
ANN. §§ 56-8-304 (Supp. 1996) (prohibiting unfair discriminatory acts that “deny, refuse to 
renew, restrict, or cancel a health benefit plan on the basis of the individual’s abuse status”)). 
See also Hellman, supra note 69, at 387. 
 72. See, e.g., Michael J. Sudekum, Homeowner’s Policies and Missouri Law Make 
Recovery for the Domestic Violence Victim/Co-Insured an Olympic Challenge, 69 UMKC L. 
REV. 363 (2000). 
 73. Mandel, supra note 63, at 684. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at n.63 (citing Dana Coleman, Domestic Violence Victims’ Insurance Rights 
Backed, N.J. LAW., Apr. 22, 1996, at 10). 
 77. Id. (citing Ellen J. Morrison, Insurance Discrimination Against Battered Women: 
Proposed Legislative Protections, 72 IND. L.J. 259, 283 (1996) (stating that insurers are not 
required to report the criteria that they use in their underwriting process)). 
 78. Patricia Cole & Sarah M. Buel, Symposium Briefing Paper: Safety and Financial 
Security for Battered Women: Necessary Steps for Transitioning from Welfare to Work, 7 GEO. 
J. POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 307, 313 (2000); see also Erin Meehan Richmond, Note, The 
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employment and training opportunities by beating her the night 
before an interview or test, promising to provide child care, 
transportation, clothing or other essentials for employment. As a 
result, the batterer psychologically undermines her confidence in her 
ability to succeed.79 Once a woman is employed, batterers often ruin 
job opportunities by causing absenteeism, frequently calling or 
appearing at a place of employment, and by continuing to undermine 
the woman’s confidence.80 Research reveals that domestic violence is 
a major barrier to employment.81 Domestic violence imposes costs on 
employers, including huge losses of employee availability and 
revenue, and also creates security problems.82 As soon as an 
employer becomes aware of domestic violence in a woman’s life, 
either through her own actions or the actions of her batterer, her 
employer may either fire her or press her to get an Order for 
Protection. An employer may perceive a woman’s failure to obtain an 
Order for Protection as a lack of cooperation, thus putting the 
woman’s employment at risk. If an employee is hurt “in the course 
of” or “arising out of” work, her exclusive remedy will be worker’s 
compensation.83 Worker’s compensation may not pay if the injury 
results from an “inherently private relationship,” but employees have 
successfully sued their employers for failing to provide secure work 
settings.84 If the employer is aware that a woman is being threatened 
and fails to protect her, the employer may have liability under a 
theory of intentional tort. Therefore, employers’ concerns about their 
own liability make battered women unappealing candidates for 
employment. 
Some observers find an argument under the Family and Medical 
Leave Act that employers must allow victims of domestic abuse to 
 
Interface of Poverty and Violence Against Women: How Federal and State Welfare Reform Best 
Respond, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 569, 580 (2001). 
 79. Raphael, supra note 33, at 31, 38. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Cole & Buel, supra note 78, at 314. 
 82. Jennifer Moyer Gaines, Comment, Employer Liability for Domestic Violence in the 
Workplace: Are Employers Walking a Tightrope without a Safety Net?, 31 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 
139, 143 (2000). 
 83. Id. at 144-45. 
 84. Id. at 147-48. 
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take leave (though not necessarily paid leave) to attend court dates.85 
This arises from the requirement that a woman who seeks an Order 
for Protection must personally appear in court even if she is 
represented by counsel. Thus, if she is employed during the court 
hours, she will miss work each time she must appear, and if her 
batterer is allowed endless continuances, her situation is exacerbated. 
Most courts around the country hear Order for Protection cases 
during mass docket calls, causing the applicant to wait for hours. In 
theory, a woman’s employer should not discriminate against her 
because of her need to protect herself, but experience suggests that 
this theory is unrealistic.86 
E. Welfare 
Welfare statistics illustrate that intimate battery cuts across all 
class lines.87 The modern battered women’s movement has 
strategically emphasized that this problem affects the safety of all 
women because such a “universalist” approach appeals to both policy 
makers and society as a whole.88 The number of women below the 
poverty line who are affected by domestic abuse is higher than in 
other classes, however, and poverty and domestic abuse are 
inextricably tied to one another.89 Poor women who are battered are 
more likely to need to rely on public services or the criminal justice 
 
 85. Id. at 148-49. 
 86. For an argument that battered women are protected from discrimination under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, see Marta B. Varela, Protection of Domestic Violence Victims 
under the New York City Human Rights Law’s Provisions Prohibiting Discrimination on the 
Basis of Disability, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1231 (2000). Varela’s argument requires, however, 
that the woman can make a showing that the abuse qualifies under the limited standards of the 
ADA. 
 87. Richmond, supra note 78, at 571 n. 13. 
 88. Id. at 571 nn.14-15 (citing Joan Meier, Domestic Violence, Character and Social 
Change in the Welfare Reform Debate, 19 LAW AND POL’Y 205, 208, 223 (1997)). 
 89. Mark Matthew Graham, Domestic Violence Victims and Welfare “Reform”: The 
Family Violence Option in Illinois, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 433, 437-40 (2002) (citing JODY 
RAPHAEL & RICHARD M. TOLMAN, TRAPPED BY POVERTY, TRAPPED BY ABUSE: NEW 
EVIDENCE DOCUMENTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WELFARE 
(Apr. 1997)); see also Cole & Buel, supra note 78, at 309-12; Richmond, supra note 78, at 571-
73; RAPHAEL, supra note 33, at 27 (finding that there is a greater incidence of domestic 
violence in households on welfare). 
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system, so their situations are exposed to public scrutiny.90 In 
contrast, a woman with a reliable income, insurance, and friends and 
family with financial resources can rely on private sources to either 
escape the abuse or remedy her situation.91 
A woman who is abused by someone who provides her with 
financial support may be reluctant to obtain an Order for Protection. 
Food, shelter, and medical care may be more critical to her than 
physical safety,92 particularly if she lacks confidence that an Order 
for Protection will actually stop the violence. Even the promise of 
some child support or maintenance may be too ethereal because 
either the reliability or the amount of support is likely to be 
insufficient. Consequently, working with a battered woman to restore 
her financial security is a critical element in obtaining her physical 
safety. Unfortunately, current welfare programs, like the courts, offer 
relief with one hand and a series of unrealistic barriers and 
expectations with the other. Once more, the system tells the battered 
woman how to live and will punish both her and her children if she 
fails to comply. As one author aptly put it, “when observed through 
the lens of domestic violence, the women are victims in need of 
assistance. When observed through the lens of public welfare, many 
of these same women are demonized and assistance is denied or 
provided sparingly with punitive conditions.”93 
The welfare reform of the 1990s, called the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA),94 caused damage to the interests of battered women in a 
number of ways.95 At the outset, the Act eliminated the concept of 
welfare as an entitlement, thus depriving recipients of their due 
process rights.96 Erin Meehan Richmond succinctly described the 
 
 90. Id. Welfare-eligible women are more likely to have obtained an Order for Protection 
and to have dealt with the courts in domestic violence matters. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Cole & Buel, supra note 78, at 310. 
 93. Richmond, supra note 78, at 595 (quoting Ruth A. Brandwein, Family Violence, 
Women and Welfare, in THE TIES THAT BIND: BATTERED WOMEN, CHILDREN, AND WELFARE 
REFORM 3, 5 (Ruth A. Brandwein ed., 1999)). 
 94. Pub. L. No. 104-193 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 29, & 42 U.S.C.). 
 95. For a discussion of PWORA, see Cole & Buel, supra note 78, at 310-12; see also 
Richmond, supra note 78, at 578-83. 
 96. Graham, supra note 89, at 449 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2001)). 
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barriers as follows: First, PRWORA replaced Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Aid to Needy Families 
(TANF), eliminating entitlement to public assistance and requiring 
states97 to cap the number of years that a person may receive TANF.98 
Thus, a woman may be unable to receive TANF because of the 
lifetime cap. Even if she does receive it, she must assume that it is a 
temporary resource. State do have an option of eliminating the cap 
for individual families under a “hardship” exception which is 
discussed further below. Second, states must require recipients to 
seek job training and employment in an effort to transition them from 
welfare to work, a primary goal of the PRWORA. Some states 
currently require participation from the beginning of receipt of any 
benefits.99 Third, the PRWORA allows states to require women to 
cooperate in establishing the paternity of their children and in seeking 
child support.100 Fourth, the states have an option to cap the level of 
benefits a woman receives for her family to discourage her from 
having more children.101 Fifth, a woman under the age of eighteen 
who has a child of more than three months old must be pursuing 
either a high school diploma or some other approved training.102 Teen 
mothers must live with a parent, a legal guardian, or an adult relative 
in order to receive benefits.103 Sixth, the PRWORA makes 
immigrants ineligible for any public assistance, whether the 
immigrants are illegal or not.104 
Under the 1996 Welfare Reform Bill, Congress set a schedule by 
which a certain percentage of welfare recipients in each state must 
attain employment. In 2001, this schedule required forty-five percent 
of single parents to work at least thirty hours per week and ninety 
percent of two parent families to work thirty-five hours per week.105 
 
 97. Richmond, supra note 78, at 579. 
 98. Id. at 579 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(1)(A)(ii), 608 (a)(7)(A)). 
 99. Richmond, supra note 78, at 580 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 607). For example, in Idaho, a 
woman who cannot find employment must engage in volunteer activity. Id. at 592-93. 
 100. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2)). 
 101. Id. at 581. 
 102. Id. at 582 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 608(q)(4)). 
 103. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(5)). 
 104. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 608, 1622(b) (Supp. V 1999)). 
 105. Graham, supra note 89, at 450 (citing ILLINOIS DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVICES, TANF 
FEDERAL PARTICIPATION RATE REQUIREMENTS, at www.state.il.us/agency/dhs/tsconp.html 
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In 2002, as this Article goes to print, President George W. Bush is 
pushing for an increase to force recipients to work forty hours a 
week. Moreover, he is advocating amendments to the welfare 
legislation that will pressure welfare recipients to get married and 
stay married. 
Under pressure from various advocacy groups that lobbied for 
mandatory waivers to protect battered women from the hardship of 
these reforms, Congress included the Family Violence Option.106 The 
Family Violence Option allows states to opt into a program that 
would identify victims of domestic violence on welfare, refer them to 
counseling and support services, and waive some of the requirements 
listed above.107 The Family Violence Option is not compulsory, and 
Health and Human Services did not adopt regulations interpreting the 
statute until 1999.108 States have no incentive to participate in the 
Family Violence Option because they receive no additional funds to 
defray the additional expense of screening and referrals. All but nine 
states have taken the option.109 Some research indicates that states 
have implemented the Family Violence Option unevenly.110 Initially, 
the waiver language in the Family Violence Option created some 
confusion regarding the “hardship” section of the original PRWORA 
that allowed states to exempt up to twenty percent of their welfare 
caseload from program requirements, for reasons including but not 
limited to domestic abuse.111 This confusion was clarified by 
Department of Health and Human Services regulations that took 
effect on October 1, 1999,112 which clarified that the participating 
 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2002). 
 106. Id. at 452. 
 107. Richmond, supra note 78, at 583-84 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A)(i)-(iii) (1999)). 
 108. Graham, supra note 89, at 455 (citing 64 Fed. Reg. 17720, 17781 (Apr. 12, 1999) 
(relevant provisions codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 260.50-260.59 (2001))). 
 109. Id. at 435 (citing National Center on Poverty Law, and Other Advocates Urge Illinois 
General Assembly to Adopt the Family Violence Option Illinois Welfare News) Mar. 2001, at 
www.povertylaw.org/advocacy/iwn/iwnarticle.cfm?id=24. 
 110. Graham, supra note 89, at 435 (citing MARCELLENE HEARN, NATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, DANGEROUS INDIFFERENCE: NEW YORK CITY’S FAILURE TO 
IMPLEMENT THE FAMILY VIOLENCE OPTION, at www.nowldef.org/html/issues/wel/ 
dangindi.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2002)). 
 111. Richmond, supra note 78, at 586. 
 112. 45 C.F.R. § 260.10 to § 260.76 (1999) Subpart B (§§ 260.50-59) address special 
provisions applicable to domestic abuse. 
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states under the Family Violence Option will not be penalized if more 
than twenty percent of their cases exceed time limits, so long as those 
cases are “federally recognized good cause domestic violence 
waivers.”113 The Family Violence Option provides no relief for 
teenage mothers or immigrant women.114  
According to a study by Tufts University, forty-two states have 
adopted policies that are likely to put poor families in a worse 
position than before welfare reform, and that, as of October 1, 1997, 
“twenty-four states have adopted welfare policies which ‘provide less 
assistance in achieving job readiness and obtaining jobs than was 
provided under previous welfare policies.’”115 
The entire Family Violence Option is based on the false 
assumption that women will voluntarily reveal to their welfare 
workers that they are being battered, that the women’s needs will be 
adequately assessed, and that states have adopted systems that will 
provide effective intervention and counseling.116 Women are 
suspicious of how their abuse is relevant to their welfare application, 
and are understandably concerned that the information will be 
misused.117 
Under PRWORA, women must cooperate in paternity and child 
support, because a failure to cooperate means a reduction in aid for 
the family.118 PRWORA is more punitive than previous welfare 
programs in that children’s benefits may now be reduced because of 
their parents’ actions.  
PRWORA also expanded the Federal Parent Locator Service 
which was originally created in 1974 to provide database information 
 
 113. Id. (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 260.55 (2001)) The hardship exception is codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 608 (a)(7)(C). See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(C)(iii) for the definition of “battered or 
subject to extreme cruelty.” 
 114. Richmond, supra note 78, at 587; see also Demie Kurz, Women, Welfare and 
Domestic Violence., 25 SOC. JUST. 105, 113 (1998). 
 115. Richmond, supra note 89, at 592 (quoting CENTER ON HUNGER AND POVERTY, TUFTS 
UNIVERSITY, ARE STATES IMPROVING THE LIVES OF POOR FAMILIES? A SCALE MEASURE OF 
STATE WELFARE POLICIES 14-16 (1998) (discussing barriers to employment); THE URBAN 
INSTITUTE, BUILDING AN EMPLOYMENT FOCUSED WELFARE SYSTEM; WORK FIRST AND 
OTHER WORK-ORIENTED STRATEGIES IN FIVE STATES 9 (1998)). 
 116. See Cole & Buel, supra note 78, at 318-20. 
 117. See Graham, supra note 89, at 457 (citing Cole & Buel, supra note 78, at 317-18). 
 118. Jacqueline M. Fontana, Cooperation and Good Cause: Greater Sanctions and Failure 
to Account for Domestic Violence, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 367, 377 (2000). 
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on parents and children. Under PRWORA, two new databases were 
created: a central registry for support orders and a Directory of New 
Hires.119 Both databases attempt to streamline the efforts to locate 
parents who owe child support. States are required to have a family 
violence indicator that is to be activated when potential safety 
concerns are recognized. The family violence indicator extends a 
waiver to women to avoid participating in otherwise mandatory 
paternity proceedings. Each state defines its own criteria for 
triggering the family violence indicator. Some rely on the existence 
of a protective order, findings of child abuse, or self reporting, 
whereas others require women to make a showing of “good cause.” 
Some observers are concerned that if women are not aware of the 
family violence indicator, they may not take the necessary action to 
trigger it to protect themselves.120 A small number of women apply 
under their state’s “good cause” requirement. In a Denver study, 
twenty-one percent said they did not apply for good cause waiver 
because of fear of their abusive partner and thirty-two percent said 
they did not have the documents to prove harm.121 
F. Immigration  
Battered women who are not citizens of the United States share all 
of the vulnerabilities of other battered women, but their 
circumstances are exacerbated by their non-citizenship status. 
Depending on their country of origin, their situation may be 
complicated by their dynamics of race, culture, class and gender, 
which are all more fully described in other articles.122 Given these 
variables, there is no “essential” immigrant woman, but these 
women’s common plight of non-citizenship status prevents them 
from taking advantage of many of the protections afforded to citizens 
 
 119. Id. at 375-76. 
 120. Id. at 376. 
 121. Jessica Pearson et al., Child Support and Domestic Violence: The Victims Speak Out, 
5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 427, 441 (table 3) (1999). 
 122. See, e.g., Cecelia M. Espenoza, No Relief for the Weary: VAWA Relief Denied for 
Battered Immigrants Lost in the Intersections, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 205-09 (1999) 
(describing the distinctive experiences of Asian women, Latinas and Non-African-American 
Black immigrants). 
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who have suffered abuse. 
As in other areas of the law that attempt to provide both protection 
and relief for battered women, immigration law reflects conflicting 
policies that ultimately undermine a woman’s ability to exercise 
agency for the safety of herself and her children. United States 
policies towards non-citizens are fraught with inconsistencies, and 
once more, the law attempts to control. Most significant to this 
Article are the immigration policies that favor marriage by giving 
advantages in obtaining citizenship to women with qualified 
marriages to citizens or lawful permanent residents. In addition, 
immigration regulations punish domestic abuse more severely than 
criminal statutes alone because they categorize a conviction for 
domestic abuse as a deportable offense. Both sets of policies result in 
traps for women who seek to escape domestic abuse. 
In order to become a United States citizen, a battered woman may 
find herself with limited options. She may independently self-petition 
for immigrant status,123 or her spouse may petition for her, which 
gives her the status of conditional residency if she has been married 
for less than two years.124 If the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) questions her status and begins its removal proceedings 
under 240A, the woman may rely on the Violence Against Women 
Act (VAWA)125 to cancel the removal proceedings.126 Each of these 
options is fraught with barriers that her batterer may exploit to 
control her.  
In order to have a removal proceeding cancelled or to self-petition 
for citizenship, a woman must prove that she has been of good moral 
character for three consecutive years prior to her application.127 Prior 
criminal acts and prostitution are grounds for finding a lack of good 
moral character, despite the fact that forced prostitution is recognized 
 
 123. Id. at 167-72 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c) (1999)). 
 124. Espenoza, supra note 122, at 173-75 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 
66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1646 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)) 
[hereinafter INA]. 
 125. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40701-40703, 108 
Stat. 1902, 1953 (1994). 
 126. Id. at 172-74. 
 127. Elizabeth Shor, Note, Domestic Abuse and Alien Women in Immigration Law: 
Response and Responsibility, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 710 (2000) (citing INA § 240, 8 
U.S.C. § 1229) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)). 
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as a form of abuse.128 The good moral character requirement leaves a 
non-citizen woman vulnerable to her abuser who may realize that he 
can threaten to have her charged with domestic violence or have her 
arrested in retaliation when she finally invokes the law or leaves her 
abuser.129 Mandatory arrest laws, no-drop policies, laws that 
encourage arrest of mutual aggressors, and programs that encourage 
police to arrest the first aggressor without determining who is really 
the provocateur130 leave non-citizen women even more subject to 
attack than the general population of women.131 If the non-citizen 
woman is arrested because of her husband’s abuse of the legal 
system, she may find herself making a Hobson’s choice, as a plea 
bargain may cause her to lose her status of good moral character for 
citizenship purposes.  
Moreover, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)132 re-defined “convictions” so that a 
woman who has been wrongly arrested may find herself being 
deported.133 Under this definition, deferred adjudications are 
considered final convictions, so a woman who accepts an offer of 
either diversion or counseling, to avoid having to go to trial, has 
technically received a conviction that may result in her deportation.134 
 
 128. Id. Shor, supra note 122, at 711 (citing INA § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (1994 
& Supp. IV 1998)). 
 129. Espenoza, supra note 122, at 171. 
 130. Id. at 181-91. 
 131. Id. at 181-205. 
 132. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 322, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-628 to 629 (1996)(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(48)(A)(Supp. III 1997)). 
 133. Id. at 180-81 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (Supp. III 1999)).  
 A conviction for immigration purposes is defined as: 
[A] formal judgement of guilt of the alien entered by a court, or if adjudication of guilt 
has been withheld, where—(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien 
has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to 
warrant a finding of guilt; and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, 
penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed. 
Id. at 180. 
 134. Id. at 181. Espenoza explains how a battered immigrant woman can suffer as a result 
of the new definition of conviction in conjunction with the “good moral character” requirement: 
In the typical case, a new aggravated felony conviction would render an applicant 
deportable, but would not make them inadmissible. Therefore, non-VAWA applicants 
are allowed to adjust their status, while VAWA applicant’s visa can be denied on the 
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Immigration policies reflect the trend toward zero tolerance for 
domestic abuse and once more, the “get tough” policies of the law 
backfire on women who are the victims of domestic abuse.135 
Because the commission of domestic abuse is grounds for 
deportation, some women are deterred from reporting their abuse.136 
For a non-citizen woman whose presence in the United States is 
based on her marriage to a permanent resident, the deportation of her 
spouse could result in her loss of ability to self-petition for 
citizenship. Additionally, if her husband is deported, she may 
subsequently be deported as well.137 Moreover, the non-citizen 
abused woman may be financially dependent on the abuser, may rely 
on him to provide language translations, or may need him to explain 
the legal and cultural systems. Thus, family and social pressures will 
deter her from being “the one” who caused the deportation of her 
husband. 
Cecelia M. Espenoza has suggested a number of solutions to the 
problems of the intersection of domestic abuse laws, immigration 
laws, and the criminal justice system which exacerbate the plight of 
battered women rather than alleviate their problems. At the outset, 
she recommends the elimination of the good moral character 
requirement from VAWA, because traditional petitioning 
requirements do not require an affirmative showing of good moral 
character.138 She suggests that judges use a case-by-case analysis to 
allow criminal and immigration courts to make judicial 
recommendations against deportation.139 Such recommendations 
would encourage the use of treatment and deterrence so that families 
can choose counseling and rehabilitation, not just punishment.140 
These remedies are especially important for women who are accused 
of domestic abuse, when in fact they are acting in self-defense or 
 
ground of lack of good moral character. The good moral character requirement which 
exists for VAWA applicants creates an adverse and uneven result. 
 135. Id. at 209-14. 
 136. Shor, supra note 127, at 706 (citing Michelle J. Anderson, A License to Abuse: The 
Impact of Conditional Status on Female Immigrants, 102 YALE L.J. 1401, 1421 (1993)). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Espenoza, supra note 122, at 215-17. 
 139. Id. at 216-17. 
 140. Id. at 218. 
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mutual combat which are often difficult for women to prove.  
Espenoza’s recommendations are victim-oriented and logical, but 
are contrary to the emerging pattern. The legislatures and courts are 
more interested in “controlling” the lives of non-citizen battered 
women, and substituting their own judgment, than they are in giving 
women the autonomy to make themselves safe from abuse. 
G. Criminal Justice System 
One of the greatest developments of the Order for Protection 
statutes is that a violation of an Order will result in a criminal charge. 
The possibility of a criminal charge provides a woman with much 
stronger clout than would the mere filing of a motion for civil 
contempt.  
In the 1980s, after the historic research completed in Minnesota, 
most jurisdictions adopted a “mandatory arrest” policy that required 
police to make an arrest regardless of the wishes of the victim.141 
Advocates for battered women argued that because police officers 
had historically been reluctant to arrest for the crime of domestic 
violence, mandatory arrest laws eliminated the inconsistencies 
allowed by individual discretion. They also argued that perpetrators 
pressured women to tell the police not to arrest, and that battered 
women should not have to choose whether to have a batterer arrested. 
The advent of the mandatory arrest policy was the first major loss of 
agency for battered women. Observers have argued that women’s 
awareness that the police will arrest their batterers regardless of their 
wishes has deterred many women from calling the police or enforcing 
their Orders for Protection.142 Women may want violence to stop, say 
these observers, but they do not necessarily want the perpetrator to be 
incarcerated. 
The development of “no-drop” policies and legislation was 
another major loss of battered women’s autonomy, and prohibited 
prosecutors from dropping their criminal charges at the request of the 
 
 141. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1859 (1996). 
 142. See Katherine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse, 110 YALE L.J. 1459, 1464 
(2000). 
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victim.143 According to Cheryl Hanna, no-drop policies may be 
“hard,” in which “cases proceed regardless of the victim’s wishes 
when there is enough evidence to go forward,”144 or “soft,” in which 
“prosecutors do not force victims to participate in the criminal 
process; rather, victims are provided with support services and 
encouraged to continue the process.”145 Hanna suggests that it is 
difficult to assess no-drop policies because of the variations of 
published policies, and the gaps that exist between the policies and 
their implementation.146 In hard no-drop cases, the prosecutor issues a 
subpoena for the woman’s testimony, and her failure to cooperate 
may result in contempt proceedings.147 Thus, she is essentially 
mandated to participate. 
Supporters of no-drop policies have encroached even further upon 
women’s autonomy through the use of “victimless” prosecutions. 
Prosecutors work closely with the police to gather all evidence as if 
the woman will not testify, so that regardless of her wishes, the 
prosecutor may go forward. To assist the police in proceeding with 
victimless prosecutions, appropriations under VAWA provide funds 
to local police departments to purchase tape recorders and instant 
cameras to help gather evidence at the scene. Additionally, money is 
appropriated for training programs so that officers would be 
knowledgeable about how to interview witnesses and gather 
evidence.148  
These prosecutorial and police practices intersect with the other 
areas of law which are invoked when a woman applies for an Order 
for Protection. She may not have a choice about obtaining an Order 
for Protection because of laws associated with custody, employment, 
welfare, or immigration, but once she gets it, she is trapped in a 
system that spins out of control. Her choice to get an Order for 
 
 143. Hanna, supra note 141, at 1862. 
 144. Id. at 1863. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 1865. 
 147. Id. at 1892 (discussing the 1983 Alaska case of Maudie Wall, a battered woman who 
was jailed for failure to participate in prosecution of her husband). 
 148. The theoretical debate regarding whether these policies are “in the best interest” of 
battered women is beyond the scope of this Article and is well-summarized in Cheryl Hanna’s 
article supporting the elimination of victims in the decision of how and whether to proceed. Id. 
at 1868-1900. 
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Protection may even impact her access to insurance protections. 
Many observers of domestic violence policy issues fail to consider 
these far-reaching consequences and ignore the fact that the criminal 
justice system does not exist in a vacuum. 
IV. HOW TO COUNSEL THE CLIENT AT RISK 
Others have documented the social, cultural, and racial dynamics 
that have discouraged women from using the State to intervene in her 
family.149 Anyone who counsels a woman about getting an Order for 
Protection has acted irresponsibly if the considerations identified by 
these scholars are not foremost in the counselor’s mind. Counselors 
must remain client-centered at all stages of the client’s case, because 
only the client knows what strategies will keep her safe and what is 
most important in her life. As Katherine K. Baker articulately argues 
in her review of Elizabeth M. Schnieder’s new book, BATTERED 
WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING,150 maintaining relationships 
may be paramount in a woman’s life. The lawyer or advocate must 
alert the client to a wide range of legal consequences, however, that 
may not be apparent to the client as she is preoccupied with her own 
safety.  
Schneider explains how advocates have “moved from being 
suspicious of the state involvement to being supportive of it,”151 but 
argues that the shift may have caused the pendulum to swing too far. 
This Article described the intersection of Civil Orders for Protection 
and the laws associated with issues of custody, insurance, 
employment, welfare, immigration and criminal prosecutions. In our 
preoccupation with one client or one theoretical cause, we may lose 
sight of the bigger picture that what was once a ticket to freedom has 
now become a license to entrap. 
 
 149. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1993). 
 150. See Baker, supra note 142. 
 151. Id. at 1470. 
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